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1 Introduction
We consider price competition between capacity constrained firms. Capacity
constraints are not rigid though, and, by incurring an additional per unit cost
of capacity expansion, firms can produce beyond capacity. As pointed out
by Boccard and Wauthy (2000, 2004), allowing for such non-rigid capacity
costs is important and, in their generalization of Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983), they explicitly follow this approach.1 Further, we focus on Bertrand
competition, i.e. price competition where firms supply all demand. This
framework can be traced back to Chamberlin (1933) and is appropriate
when the costs of turning away customers are high (see, for example, Vives
(1999)).2
We find that there is an interval of prices such that any price in this
interval can be sustained as a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Moreover, no
other price can be sustained as an equilibrium. We then examine some
comparative statics properties of this interval. Even in the limit as the
number of firms tend to infinity, the set of equilibrium prices turn out to be
a non-degenerate interval. While the competitive price is the lowest price
in this set, it contains other prices also. Further, as the cost of capacity
expansion increases, the maximal price that is sustainable in equilibrium
increases.
Turning to the literature, this paper complements Boccard and Wauthy
(2000, 2004), who also examine non-rigid capacity costs, though for the case
where firms are free to supply less than the quantity demanded. Another
interesting class of models examines capacity constrained firms with rigid
capacity where, given prices, firms are willing to supply till capacity. Pa-
pers in this framework include, among others, Allen and Hellwig (1986),
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), and Vives (1986). The present paper clearly
traces its ancestry to both these streams of the literature.
1Other papers to allow for non-rigid capacity constraints include Dixit (1980).
2The literature on Bertrand competition is a relatively recent one. It includes, among
others, Dastidar (1995), Maggi (1996), Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003), Ray Chaud-
huri (1996), Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004), etc.
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2 The Model
The market comprises n (≥ 2) identical firms, all producing a single ho-
mogeneous good, and having the same cost function, C(q). The firms are
capacity contsrained with a (non-rigid) capacity level of k. Thus the cost
function
C(q) =
{
cq, if 0 ≤ q ≤ k,
ck + c′(q − k), if q > k,
where c′ > c > 0 and (c′ − c) represents the per unit cost of capacity
expansion. Interestingly the cost function is somewhat non-standard in that
it is not only discontinuous at q = k > 0, but is convexo-concave (i.e. can
be approximated by convexo-concave functions).
The market demand function f(p) satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (i) f : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is twice differentiable. Moreover,
f(p) is negatively sloped and weakly concave ∀p such that f(p) > 0.
(ii) Also, limp→∞ f(p) < c and f
−1(0) > c′.
For ease of exposition, we assume that f(c
′)
n
< k.3
Let Di(p1, · · · , pi, · · · , pn) denote the demand facing firm i as a function
of the announced price vector (p1, · · · , pi, · · · , pn) so that
Di(p1, · · · , pi, · · · , pn) =
{
0, if pi > pj, for some j,
f(pi)
m
, if pi ≤ pj, ∀j, and #(l : pl = pi) = m.
Thus the profit of the i-th firm
pii(p1, · · · , pn) = (pi −AC(Di(p1, · · · , pn)))Di(p1, · · · , pn).
We examine a game of Bertrand competition where the firms simulta-
neously announce their prices and supply all demand. We solve for pure
strategy Nash equilibria in prices.
3As we argue later though, the analysis goes through qualitatively even if f(c
′)
n
≥ k.
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3 The Analysis
We begin by characterizing the set of Nash equilibria. Let us introduce some
notations.
Definition. Let pi(p) denote the profit of any firm that undercuts all
other firms by charging p, where c ≤ p ≤ c′. Formally,
pi(p) = f(p)p− ck − c′[f(p)− k]. (1)
Lemma 1 below summarizes some properties of pi(p). The proofs of all
the lemmas are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1.
(i) pi(p) is increasing in p, ∀p ∈ [c, c′].
(ii) pi(c) = (k − f(c))(c′ − c) < 0 and pi(c′) = k(c′ − c) > 0.
We require another
Definition. Let pi(p, n) denote the profit of any firm if all firms charge
the same price p, where c ≤ p ≤ c′. Formally,
pi(p, n) =
{
f(p)
n
(p− c), if f(p)
n
≤ k,
pf(p)
n
− ck − c′[f(p)
n
− k], if f(p)
n
> k.
(2)
In case f(c)
n
> k, let p solve f(p)
n
= k (p is clearly well defined). We then
discuss some properties of pi(p, n).
Lemma 2.
(i) ∂pi(p,n)
∂p
|p=c > 0.
(ii) pi(p, n) has a unique maximum and is increasing (respectively decreasing)
to the left (respectively right) of this maximal price.
(iii) pi(c′, n) = f(c
′)
n
(c′ − c) > 0.
(iv) pi(c, n) =
{
0, if f(c)
n
≤ k,
(k − f(c)
n
)(c′ − c) < 0, if f(c)
n
> k.
Given Lemmas 1 and 2 we have the following
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Lemma 3.
(i) pi(c′) > pi(c′, n).
(ii) pi(c, n) > pi(c).
(iii) ∂pi(p,n)
∂p
<
∂pi(p)
∂p
, ∀p ∈ [c, c′].
Given the preceding lemmas we have the following definitions.
Definition. Let p′′ be the unique p that satisfies pi(p, n) = pi′(p).4
Further, from Lemmas 3(i) and 3(ii), we have that c < p′′ < c′.
Definition. For f(c)
n
> k, let p˜ define the minimum p such that pi(p, n) =
0.5
Definition. Finally, let
p′ =
{
c, if f(c)
n
≤ k,
p˜, otherwise.
The next lemma follows from the preceding discussion.
Lemma 4.
(i) p˜ solves pf(p)
n
− ck − c′[f(p)
n
− k] = 0.
(ii) p˜(n) is decreasing in n.
(iii) p′′(n) is decreasing in n.
(iv) For all p ∈ [c, c′], pi(p, n) ≥ pi(p) if and only if p ∈ [c, p′′].
We are now in a position to characterize the set of equilibrium prices.
Proposition 1 below demonstrates that there is an interval such that any
price in this interval can be sustained as a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Any price p ∈ [p′, p′′] can be
sustained as a symmetric Nash equilibrium. No other price can be sustained
as an equilibrium.
Proof: (a) We first demonstrate that any price p ∈ [p′, p′′] can be sus-
4That such a p′′ exists follows from Lemma 3(i), 3(ii) and the intermediate velue
theorem. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 3(iii).
5From Lemma 2(iii) and 2(iv), p˜ is well defined.
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tained as a symmetric equilibrium where all firms charge the price p.
We argue that no firm can deviate by charging a higher price compared
to p, and gain. From the definition of p′, all firms make zero profits at p′.
We then argue that pi(p, n) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [c, p′′]. Suppose to the contrary,
there exists some p ∈ (c, p′′] for which pi(p, n) < 0. Given Lemma 2(ii), this
implies that pi(p′′, n) < 0. This in turn implies that pi(c′, n) < 0, which
contradicts Lemma 2(iii). Whereas any firm that deviates and charges a
higher price has no demand, and thus obtains a zero profit.
We next argue that any firm that undercuts and charges p − ,  > 0,
has a lower profit. This follows since
pi(p− ) < pi(p) ≤ pi(p, n),
where the first inequality follows as pi(p) is increasing in p (Lemma 1(i)),
and the second inequality follows from Lemma 4(iv).
(b) We then argue that no other price can be sustained as an equilibrium.
We first demonstrate that no price p < p′ can be sustained. If p′ = c
this is obvious. So let p′ > c and suppose to the contrary that a price less
than p′ can be sustained. But then the number of firms charging this price
must be less than n (otherwise they have a loss). But this implies that p˜ is
increasing in n, a contradiction to Lemma 4(i).
Finally, consider some price c′ ≥ p > p′′. In case all n firms charge
this price, one of the firms can undercut by a small enough amount and
gain, since at p > p′′ we have that pi(p) > pi(p, n) (Lemma 4(iv)). Whereas
if the number of firms charging this price is strictly less than n, then one
of the firms who charges a higher price, can undercut by a small enough
amount and get a strictly positive profit. This follows from the fact that
since pi(p′′) = pi(p′′, n) > 0 and pi(p) is increasing, pi(p) is strictly positive
for all c′ ≥ p ≥ p′′. Finally, if p > c′, then any firm that undercuts makes a
gain.
We then examine some interesting comparative statics properties. We
first examine the limit properties of the equilibrium set, i.e. [p′(n), p′′(n)],
as n goes to infinity. We need one final assumption.
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Assumption 2. There exists a choke-off price pˆ, such that f(p) = 0
∀p ≥ pˆ and f(p) > 0 ∀p < pˆ.
Interestingly, even for n arbitrarily large, the limit equilibrium set turns
out to be a non-degenerate interval. Interpreting c as the competitive price,
we find that the competitive price is only one member of the limit equilibrium
set. This is interesting since in models with rigid capacity, Allen and Hellwig
(1986) and Vives (1986), both find that for n large, the equilibrium prices
converge, at least in distribution, to the competitive price.
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then limn→∞[p
′(n), p′′(n)] =
[c, p], where c′ > p > c.
Proof. (i) Note that for n large f(c)
n
≤ k. Consequently, p′′(n) solves
f(p)
n
(p− c) = pf(p)− ck − c′(f(p)− k).
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, f(p)(p − c) is bounded above by f(0)(pˆ − c).
Therefore as n becomes large, the LHS goes to zero. Thus in the limit we
must have
f(p)(c′ − p) = k(c′ − c).
Hence if p = c, then from the preceding equation, f(c) = k, which is a
contradiction. Finally note that if p > c′, then for p close to p the firms can
profitably undercut.
(ii) For n large, f(c)
n
< k, so that from Lemmas 2 and 3, pi(c, n) > pi(c),
and pi(c, n) = 0. Thus p′ = c.
We finally examine the effect of an increase in the capacity costs, i.e. c′,
on the equilibrium outcome. Interestingly, as the capacity costs increase,
higher prices can be sustained in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. If capacity costs c′ increases
then
(a) p′′ increases, and
(b) p′ increases if f(c)
n
> k and remains unaffected otherwise.
6
Proof. From equation (1), pi(p) is decreasing in c′. Whereas pi(p, n) is
decreasing in c′ if f(p)
n
> k. Otherwise, pi(p, n) does not depend on c′. Thus,
with an increase in c′, p′′ increases. If f(c)
n
> k, then p′ = c, otherwise p′ = p˜.
The result now follows from Lemma 4(i).
Remark. How critical is the assumption that f(c
′)
n
< k? In case f(c
′)
n
≥ k,
it is easy to see that Proposition 1 goes through with the modification that
p′′ is replaced by c′. Thus the only result that is qualitatively affected is
that the maximal price becomes independent of the number of firms as well
as the demand parameters, though still dependent on the costs of capacity
expansion.
4 Conclusion
We examine a model of Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity con-
straints, so that by incurring an additional cost, firms can produce beyond
capacity. We find that there is an interval of prices such that a price can
be sustained as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it lies in
this interval. We then examine the properties of this set as (a) the num-
ber of firms becomes large and (b) the capacity cost increases. For n large,
the limit equilibrium set is a non-degenerate interval, with the competitive
price being the lowest price in this interval. Further, as the capacity cost
increases we find that the maximum possible price that can be sustained as
an equilibrium increases.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) ∂pi(p)
∂p
= f ′(p)(p − c′) + f(p) > 0 (since p ≤ c′).
(ii) Follows from (1).
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) ∂pi(p,n)
∂p
|p=c equals
f(c)
n
> 0 if f(c)
n
≤ k and equals
f ′(c)
n
(c− c′) + f(c)
n
otherwise.
(ii) For f(c)
n
≤ k, we have that f(p)
n
≤ k ∀p ≥ c. Thus
pi′′(p, n) = 2f ′(p) + f ′′(p)(p − c) ≤ 0.
Next consider f(c)
n
> k. First note that for p ∈ [c, p], pi′(p, n) = 1
n
[f(p)+
f ′(p)(p− c′)] > 0, so that pi(p, n) is increasing over the whole interval [c, p].
From the first part of the argument, pi(p, n) is concave over [p, c′]. Finally,
note that the left hand derivative of pi(p, n) at p, i.e. 1
n
[f(p)+ f ′(p)(p− c′)],
is greater than the right hand derivative at p, i.e. 1
n
[f(p) + f ′(p)(p − c)].
Hence the claim follows.
(iii) and (iv) Follows from equation (2).
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Note that pi(c′) = k(c′ − c). Further, since
f(c′)
n
< k, pi(c′, n) = f(c
′)
n
(c′ − c). Thus pi(c′) > pi(c′, n).
(ii) Note that pi(c) = (c′ − c)(k − f(c)) < 0. Moreover, if f(c)
n
≤ k, then
pi(c, n) = 0 > pi(c). Whereas, if f(c)
n
> k, then pi(c, n) = (c′ − c)[k − f(c)
n
] >
pi(c).
(iii) Follows straightaway from euqations (1) and (2).
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Suppose f(c)
n
> k. The result follows since pi(p, n)
is increasing over [c, p] and
pi(p, n) =
f(p)
n
(p − c) > 0.
(ii) Follows since p˜ solves
k(c′ − c) =
f(p)
n
(c′ − p).
(iii) Since f(p
′′)
n
< k, pi(p′′, n) = f(p
′′)
n
(p′′ − c).
(iv) Follows from Lemma 1, 2 and 3.
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